1h 10min · about 8,800 wordsDownload Transcript
0:00Good morning. And welcome to this program on the intersection of the attorney client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the professional obligation of confidentiality. My name is Evan Stewart. I'm a partner, Cohen and Gresser based in Manhattan. And I'll be your presenter today, I've been asked to ask you to remain muted during the duration of my presentation, I will be posting the completion code that you'll need to earn credit in the chat near the end of my presentation, please write that down and enter it on your LexVid account after the course is completed. Instructions on how to do that had been emailed to you. If you have any questions regarding the content of this presentation, you can either post them in the chat, and I'll try to address them at the end. Or the folks that LexVid will unmute you. And you can ask me at the end if you have questions. So with that, as a introduction of the technical side, let me get to the substance of today's presentation. Now, the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine and the obligation of confidentiality all sound very, very similar. But there they are interrelated concepts. They're very different. And unfortunately, these three concepts are not well understood by lawyers and courts. They are disliked by the government, by prosecutors and regulators. And they're dangerous, very dangerous areas to litigate. And if we have time, I will take you through two cases in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, both involving Kellogg,
2:04brown, and root, which will show you how people completely misunderstand and screw these all up. Beyond beyond beliefs. If I don't have time to get to those, you can look at an article I've written, which is on my law firm website, from the New York Business Law Journal, from the winter of 2015, entitled The DC circuit wrong and longer. But again, hopefully, we'll have some time to go through that, at least in a cursory fashion.
2:40So let me first turn to the concept of confidentiality. And this is, it's important to emphasize that this is an ethical rule that lawyers have written to govern the conduct of lawyers. This is an ethical obligation that we have to keep client confidences. And if we don't do this properly, we can be sanctioned disbarred, etc. So let's start with the American Bar Association model rule 1.6, which the ABA amended in 2003. And the basic rule is, lawyers have to keep client confidences. But there's some exceptions. And so the ABA said, here are some exceptions. You can breach your obligation of confidentiality, you may you don't have to you may where certain death or substantial bodily injury would be a consequence of not breaching the duty of confidentiality, you may disclose to prevent a crime or fraud, where substantial financial injury is involved. And the lawyer's services are used. You may disclose to mitigate or rectify a crime or fraud has already occurred, where there's substantial financial injury, and the lawyers services were used. Importantly, and I'll come back to why this is important in a bit. They added two words in another section of 1.6. Previously the rule and said you can breach your confidentiality to establish a claim that's gonna be established a defense, a defense so if there's a dispute between you and a client regarding a fee, you could breach client confidentiality, to establish if he in fact, was doing knowing. But in 2003, the ABA I added two words claim or in front of the word
5:05defense. So, according to the ABA, you now can disclose, you may disclose to establish a claim or defense. In discharging, this duty of the ABA said, standard is what you actually knew. At the time. Example, when somebody was threatening a certain death, or substantial bodily injury, what did you actually know? Very important standard. Now, very important to note, again, I'll come back to the significance of this in a bit. Very important to note that the American Bar Association model rules are binding on absolutely no one. Let me emphasize, emphasize that again, they're binding on absolutely no one. Remember that the American Bar Association is merely a trade association of lawyers. It's true, but there are trade associations for plumbers, or electricians, all sorts of people. That's just what the ABA model rules are rules promulgated by a trade association. binding on no one. The real question is, what are the rules in the states where the state in which every lawyer, he or she is licensed, because those are the only rules we'll get back to this minute aren't necessarily only rules, but they're the primary rules that govern our conduct. And so, as this slide says, basically, states have gone essentially in five different directions. And especially with respect to model 1.61, group of states have adopted word for word, sentence for sentence, semicolon, semicolon, rule 1.6. And one of those states that important state is Delaware. Some states, just because they don't adopt things 100% essentially adopted rule 1.6 When he
7:28promulgated in 2003. But it's not every single word is the same. Every single semi colon is the same, but it's essentially the same as the ABA standard. The third group of states said, we like what we already have, we're not going to change what was in existence prior to 2003. Another group of states have continued their very idiosyncratic rules in Illinois is a prime example of that. And then a fifth group of states completely rejected what the ABA, a handed down their position is, under no circumstances. And under. In no way should lawyers ever breach their client confidences. There are no exceptions, and two prominent states are Washington and state of California. So to emphasize and illustrate this, let's look at what New York has done.
8:39And what New Jersey has done. Two states separated only by the Hudson River. In 2009, six years after the ABA model rule was changed. The New York State Bar authority, authorities completely changed all of York's ethics rules. Willy overhauled it with respect to 1.6. This is what New York State did. In New York State lawyers may disclose certain death or substantial bodily injury was threatened to prevent a client crime or to establish a defense. Now, interestingly, New York has gone farther than virtually every jurisdiction in establishing what many people call a so called noisy withdrawal. And and in three very limited circumstances, lawyers may withdraw legal opinions where they believe some wrongdoing has occurred or is occurring and the people are relying on those legal opinions.
9:55This is a very significant thing that New York has done very few jurisdictions have allowed this. And the practical implications are, of course, as I just explained this to my law class yesterday. You're not withdrawing from the representation per se of a client. Although you could do that as well. What you're doing is telling the other lawyer in a transaction, for example, that some legal opinion you've offered, that is important for purposes of the transaction, that he or she could no longer rely on that opinion that you're withdrawing it. Out, there's a broader ethical obligation that lawyers, especially when they're withdrawing their entire representation of a client, that they must do so in a way, in a way that's not going to hurt the client, or to minimize harm to the client. So you, you can't say when you're withdrawing these legal opinions in these in these three limited circumstances in New York, I'm doing it because my clients a fraudster, you just have to, all you're allowed to say is, I'm with, I want you to know, you can't rely on that opinion on withdrawing an opinion. Not surprisingly, or obviously, the lawyer on the other side should view that as a huge red flag and draw his or her and her obvious conclusions as to why you're withdrawing. But you're not at liberty to go that extra sentence and explain why. So on the one hand, New York, has gone further than the model rule, and further than other jurisdictions in this withdrawal of opinions. In another sense, however, New York has been much less expansive, in fact, more
11:58restrictive, because New York specifically carved out financial fraud from the definition of crime. So while you may disclose to prevent a client crime, he may not disclose to prevent financial fraud. Very important distinction in New York, how important I'll come back to in a minute. Unlike the model rule, again, New York more restrictive, there's no change with respect to past client conduct, under no circumstances with respect to past client conduct. Can you disclose client confidences.
12:43Also important live in New York State, there's no so called reporting out. And that's under a different rule 1.13. But that concept is, is we lawyers, when we're representing companies, we have an obligation to go up the so called chain of command, to make sure that our opinion on a certain matter is heard, to our satisfaction. In other words, if you go to the Chief Financial Officer and say, I don't think this document is accurate, because two plus two does not equal five, and he blows you off and says Get lost, I'm in charge of the math, you're not you. You have an obligation to go above him to try to rectify what you think is going to be a false financial filing. And you try to go as high up the chain of command in the company, possibly, perhaps to the Board of Directors of the audit committee, to try to make sure that the right thing is done. If, however, in New York State, you do not get satisfaction, even at the highest level, that no one has implemented your excellent legal advice. You cannot go outside the company and call it the SEC or the Department of Justice or whomever to report that some bad thing is is going on. You literally have two options. One is to resign. Or the second is to go back to your office and have a good cry. So there's no reporting out once you go up the chain of command. New York, like the ABA employs the actual knowledge standard. New Jersey right across the Hudson River, very, very different standards. New Jersey, lawyers must disclose a criminal illegal or fraudulent act, lawyer reasonably believes
14:54will result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial financial harm. Lawyers also must disclose criminal, illegal or fraudulent acts that the lawyer reasonably believes could constitute a fraud on the tribunal. But those are not conditional obligations. Those are mandatory obligations. New Jersey lawyers also may disclose the foregoing to the person affected by the conduct. And the US, he or she also may disclose to rectify a client's criminal illegal or fraudulent act in which the lawyer's services reused. Now a key term and all this is reasonably believes, what's a reasonable belief? Well, in New Jersey, reasonable belief is one that is founded on or grounded on some foundation, in fact, those quotes, so you don't have to be metaphysically certain that something was going on wrong. You just merely have to be have some foundation. In fact, New Jersey, unlike New York, does allow reporting out in fact, it's expressly permitted in New Jersey is rule 1.13, subsection C. So again, from the grouping of the five states, and just comparing and contrasting New York State and New Jersey, you can see that the rules here are very different depending on where you're licensed. And if that's not complicated enough, the same year the ABA changed its rules. In fact, the ABA changes rules substantially in response to something that Securities and Exchange Commission did. So in response to Enron, WorldCom, and some other well known disasters. At that time, Congress passed Sarbanes Oxley Oxley legislation. And
17:02part of that legislation was allowing the FCC to promulgate regulations to govern the conduct of lawyers. So called Section 307, of that law. Now, a lot has been talked about Sarbanes Oxley, and a lot of it's, unfortunately, some misinformation. So I'm hoping that this will clear some of this up for you. Under the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Section 307, lawyers who are subject to this regulation, and so who are those lawyers? Let's clear that up right now. There are two set types of lawyers, which attend to it are intersect with one another, but not necessarily governs two types of lawyers. First lawyers who practice before the SEC, people like me, and also people who represent public companies. So, so called capital markets, lawyers, and that also encompasses me, again, most people, many people will intersect on both those points. But there will be some people, the capital markets, lawyers who don't practice for the SEC, and some people who practice for the SEC who aren't necessarily capital markets, lawyers.
18:32But these regulations are designed to capture both sets of lawyers, obviously, people, lawyers who represent public companies, that's a pretty large group of people, for sure, much larger than people who practice for the commission. Anyway, that's a fairly large group of lawyers captured by this set of obligations to make disclosures. And section 307 says, lawyers may disclose, quote, material violations, close quote, of the securities laws, past, current or future, past current or future. So the SEC. And I talked about the actual knowledge standard before, which is in the ABA role in New York State. Under the SEC regulations, when they're when they're evaluating your conduct, about whether you should have disclosed a material violation past current or future, they're going to look to you and not as to what you actually knew at the time, but what a reasonable lawyer should have known under the circumstances. And that's a pretty dangerous, hindsight judgment, because at the time they're making that judgment, of course, the corporate train wreck has already occurred. Enron has already occurred. Why didn't the lawyers stop this?
20:04And the lawyers defense of I didn't know, is not a good defense to this, because that's not the test. The test is what a reasonable lawyer should have done and known under the circumstances. So a very dangerous standard that the SEC has added. And it makes it more scary. The SEC has at its disposal, all of the sanctions to go against lawyers available to the commission to under the 1934 Securities Act. Now, I mentioned at the outset of this, some confusion or disinformation about what the FCC did 20 years ago, one things they did not do is provide a noisy withdrawal. This was talked about it was proposed in the initial draft of the regulations, but in response to criticisms to that draft, by people, among others, me, they decided to put that on the shelf. And I've never acted on that. So unlike New York State, which I said has three very limited noisy withdrawal scenarios. In the SEC rules, there is no noisy withdrawal.
21:24So if you've heard something about a noisy withdrawal under the SCCs, Sarbanes Oxley rules, I hope you now know, there is no such thing. So where does that leave us? Just on this set of materials that I've just gone through? Well leaves us with several open issues. First, there's what I call the heads you win tails, I lose liability whipsaw. So let's say you fail to disclose, and you're wrong. Then the SEC, and the plaintiff's lawyers will go after you. What about if you disclose, and you're wrong, then your clients and shareholders will come up to you. So this is a pretty unhappy situation where, especially since it's unmanned, under most circumstances, not necessarily in New Jersey, but under most circumstances, this is a conditional disclosure. obligation. You don't have to, but you may if you get this wrong, disclosing or failing to dispose. Somebody's gonna be very unhappy with you. So there's a premium on being right, all the time, for sure. One of the reasons and then the second reason is there's a multi jurisdictional whipsaw. One of the reasons I emphasize the disparate states reactions to the ABA model rule is very few lawyers that I know, practice law in just one jurisdiction, the jurisdiction in which they're licensed. People are doing transactions, people are handling litigation and arbitrations all over the place all the time. They're getting advice all the time. They're getting on the screen and transporting themselves by screen, to deal with clients, not just in New York State or Pennsylvania or wherever, all over
23:27the country and all over the world. And when you're doing that, you have to understand that if you have a substantial involvement in another jurisdiction, where you're giving legal advice, that jurisdiction takes the position that you're subject to their ethical rules. So you need to really be very sensitive to the fact that these disclosure obligations as they differ from state to state to state, if you're transacting law, your legal business in Louisiana. Their disclosure obligations under the Napoleonic Code may be very, very different than New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, or wherever. And you need to be somewhat familiar with them, especially if you feel something's going wrong. So there's a potential multi jurisdictional whipsaw if California believes you've not handled this process correctly, and they may take some sanctions against you, because they take these obligations, for example, very seriously.
24:39Then the third issue is a preemption issue. And I hope you now have some good grasp, or better that the SEC is rules are very Very different than a number of other jurisdictions. And I've just highlighted here, they're very different than New York's very different than New York's. So if you're a New York lawyer, and you're prohibited from disclosing past client conduct, well, that's not the SEC standard at all. They're expecting you to disclose past client conduct securities violations. So, what do you do when you're faced with two very different choices? Disclose not disclosing under New York law and disclosing under the FCC standards? If you make the New York bar authorities mad, they're gonna come after you. If you make the SEC mad, they're gonna come after you. Very difficult situation. I thought I knew the answer to this question. With a decision by the Second Circuit in Quest Diagnostics, number of years ago. Very good decision by Judge Gerbrand is a very well respected jurist on the Second Circuit, which didn't involve Sarbanes Oxley per se, but it's a separate federal law in someone had brought a whistleblowing qui tam case against his former employer. And the court did not allow that to go forward, because it was inconsistent with that person's ethical obligations of confidentiality, which this plaintiff said were trumped by the particular federal statute and his obligations under that statute. The court rejected that argument on the ground that for there to be preemption of New York State law, which
26:46governs that New York lawyer, there had to be crystal clear guidance by Congress when it passed the federal statute in question that Congress intended to preempt state law. And the court said, that's what the Supreme Court says the standard is. And there's no evidence in that federal statute that Congress had that intent. Well, I thought that would end this subject. Because when Congress passed Sarbanes Oxley, there's absolutely no evidence stress the word Absolutely. It's just the word no. Straps. It's just the word evidence, absolutely no evidence that Congress intended to preempt lawyers, state licensed licenses, with respect to whatever regulations, the Securities and Exchange might promulgate absolutely no evidence. So I thought, with the standard by the Supreme Court, and as interpreted by Judge congrat, with the branches, that would be sort of the end of this. But then there's a case in California, subsequent to that, so called BioRad. Laboratories case, which allowed a whistleblowing lawyer to in fact, breach his obligations, contrary to California law, based upon the notion that Sarbanes Oxley in SEC is regulations promulgated there under did preempt state law. And that court, interestingly, invited the SEC to submit an amicus brief, where the SEC made it crystal clear as they have 20 years, the SEC believes that the regulations preempt state law. And the magistrate judge in that case, said, Well, I'm going to defer to the SEC on this, because it's sort of like a chevron like deference. They're the experts of their own
28:53regulations. Now, that is an incorrect statement of preemption law, correct statement of preemption laws, as Judge Cabrera has enunciated in Quest Diagnostics. following spring, very crystal clear Supreme Court rulings. Chevron deference has nothing to do with preemption law, that's a completely different notion. That's an issue about administrative law, not preempted law. So that's that precedent is a wrongly decided precedent. But it is nonetheless a precedent that allowed that lawyer to go forward and actually recovered quite a substantial recovery in damages. And so there's essentially a circuit split between the Second Circuit and the ninth circuit now with all the other circuits not so far as I know not having weighed in on this particular matter. And in my experience, Um, the FCC is not shy about litigating issues like this in other circuits that have not yet resolved the matter. So, if you're lucky enough to get this problem in the Second Circuit, I guess the good news is, I think I've got the right answer to protect you. But there are a whole bunch of other circuits where this is unresolved. So in all those other circuits, this is a test case waiting to happen to some nice lawyer who thinks if I follow my state's rules, I will be fine. The FCC, if they feel strongly about it, maybe bringing an action against you, because you didn't follow their own rules. So be very careful about this preemption issue. It's a test case waiting to happen. So that's enough. In the short time, I have to talk to you about confidentiality.
31:02Let's talk about the attorney client privilege. Now, this is a this is not a ethical rule, written by lawyers, to govern lawyers. This is a rule of evidence. This is the law is a law of evidence. You can find it in federal, of evidence section 501. In New York State, it's found in the CPLR, section 40503, subsection A, it's actually in the law and goes back to jolly old England, it's the oldest law of privilege that exists. And it's a stronger concept than confidentiality. Again, it's a law. It's not a bunch of rules written by lawyers, to govern lawyers, it's a law. And another important difference is unlike client, confidentiality, which is something where lawyers make judgments about should I uphold this or not, this is a privilege that's owned by the client, not by the lawyer, very important difference. Only the client can waive privilege. It's not the lawyer's duty or opportunity to do this, only the client can do this. And to understand the privilege, I've worked out a test called the five C's there must be the five C's for the privilege to exist. Must be client, there must be a communication, there must be confidentiality. It must be with a counsel a lawyer, and it must involve the giving of legal advice. All five C's are required. Four out of five are not good enough. I talked about waivers before. When you waive this privilege. Once you do that, the privilege is gone. It can never be resurrected.
33:15I've given you just a Pennsylvania case from 2019. It's an example for that. Now, the most important seminal decision in this space, is the Upjohn decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1981. And they are the the court, I thought, really great, it's a great decision to really understand the importance of this privilege, especially in the setting of modern corporations. Because the issue here was, could the court could they could the company Upjohn assert a privilege, a corporate attorney client privilege for all of its employees, all of its employees, as opposed to a so called control group, very small group of people at the very pinnacle of the company who actually control it. In the court rejected the concept of control group just said, no, no, everybody is protected by the corporate attorney client privilege. Everyone. Why is that? They said, Well, essentially, for this all to work, for legal services to work. It's a basic principle.
34:33It's really a two way street. Clients give facts to the lawyers and lawyers give advice back to the client. And, as the Court rightly said, the people the very apex of an organization very, very rarely actually know the facts. They know the facts because somebody else has told them the facts because So you're saying, it's the people in the mailroom that people driving the trucks, the people writing the contracts, the people dealing with customers, those are the people who know what the facts are. And so all the people have to be covered by the attorney, client, corporate attorney client privilege, book, the Supreme Court, all the people. And they said, The reason for this is because it's so this is 1981. It's so difficult for companies facing the complexities of our legal and regulatory world, this 1981, it's now 42 years later, it's gotten 42 times.
35:45Much more complicated over that time period than it wasn't Indian 1981. This is so complicated and difficult for companies to come into legal compliance in ensuring that lawyers are as close and as able to get those facts out. So that they can help clients, corporate clients come into legal compliance. That promotes a broad public interest. And so this is really important. And this is why we're doing this. And as a result, they borrowed an AI set of IRS subpoenas issued to Upjohn with respect to fact gathering it had done throughout the world with respect to alleged illegal payments to various people around the world. Now, this is federal law. This is federal law. And it's followed by most United States jurisdictions. New York, for example, has adopted this as its standard. But remember, every state is free to row the boat in a different direction. And I've given you two examples. Illinois and Arizona don't follow this standard. They they believe in the control group standard. And up John was more recently reaffirmed in the swindler in Berlin case, saying that the privilege survives death and or criminal proceedings. Now recently, there was litigation. That said maybe there's an additional test beyond the five C's. Now, there is not according to up, John, what are the classic treatise on the privilege Wigmore? If you look at the CPLR, there isn't an the treatise by Professor Alexander No. But growing out of some case law where lawyers were also acting as tax return preparers, slash accountants, there has
37:57developed a so called primary purpose test. Since there is no accountant or tax preparer privilege. That's very clear. And in some jurisdictions, this primary purpose test has expanded beyond just tax preparations. The DC circuit adopted an amended version of the primary purpose test in the brown, Kellogg, brown and root. One of the two pieces I mentioned before was obtaining or providing legal advice, the primary purpose of the communication, meaning one of the significant purposes of the communication. Now, the Supreme Court recently took on a case to decide what the right case should be. Was there truly a circuit split between primary purpose and significant purpose? After oral argument, on January of this year, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Why? Who knows? But some likely reasons include, it was really not a very good test case, because the 54 documents at issue involve communications between the client and an accountant employed by the law firm, not an attorney had oral argument. The lawyer arguing the dramatic difference, essentially conceded that the practical effects of either standard were little to none. The judges were having a hard time understanding what you're talking about. And Justice Barrett, in the colloquy said, because there was some suggestion that should be some 7030 test or 6040 tests and we can't get into this whole person, put a percentage on it, maybe it's best to say nothing. And then ultimately, that's the effect of rejecting the writ of certiorari. This is
40:00actually this discussion about primary purpose 6040 7030. This is quite an owl, analogous to some legal cases. Back in the 90s. I haven't even gotten to the attorney work product yet, start to introduce this to where some judges imposed a gloss on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that embodies the attorney work product doctrine 26, p3, and that says, Things protected by the attorney work product doctrine, RNA done, materials done in quote, in anticipation of litigation. And some judges said, Well, I don't like that standard, I'm going to impose primarily in anticipation of litigation, or principally, or exclusively in anticipation of litigation. And I've given you some examples of some of those cases in the United States versus Edelman, to a panel headed up by Pierre Laval correctly noted that none of those modifiers are part of 26 B three. And hence, he wrote a very good decision. Showing that unlike many federal judges, he really understands these rules. He said, the relevant standard for rule 2063 is whether the document in question or documents in question were created, quote, because of what's called the prospect of litigation. We'll come back to that in a little bit. But this, this whole thing about primary purpose test, we've already been down this road 25 years ago, with all these other decisions, in judge Revell correctly threw them out. Now, I mentioned before that a lot of people don't like the privilege. Let me just show you this is not just me saying this. One federal judge said to a company asserting the privilege,
42:03it's frankly, striking that a corporation that purports to operate in this public market and serve the public is asserting an attorney client privilege here. I mean, that comes as it comes this remarkable ability. I think the corporation should be embarrassed in taking this position. It's hard for me to see how they can take this position with a straight face and go before public agencies and say we are absolutely Foursquare in the foregoing of hailing your public business postcode, and a Georgetown Law professor who's specializes in ethics, which is what I also teach. In my spare time, it's quoted as saying corporations often use the privilege to Stonewall and facilitate cover ups, corporate counsel treat litigation as if it's a game rather than the administration of justice. If there is serious wrongdoing, the real injustice is that we would never find out, because it would be buried under the privilege. So here, a federal judge and a law professor, ethics law professor, really don't understand the purpose of this privilege at all, but that you have some flavor for why some people don't like it.
43:11Now, there's a lot of pressure, not just people not liking it, the government has put a lot of pressure on people to waive this privilege and give over privileged materials. When, when there's the Department of Justice investigation, there's a series of memos written by a Deputy Attorney General's McNulty Thompson Gates, who talked about what it means to be, quote, cooperative with the government. And they went from the standpoint of demanding this. Now after a case in the Second Circuit, United States v. Stein, they don't demand it. But they strongly encourage it, just so you get the point. Then the question is, well, if I give it up to the government, can I selectively waive it to the government and resist this when the private plaintiffs bring lawsuits against the client?
44:13Well, that's a strategy that works only in one circuit, the Eighth Circuit, every other circuit has explicitly rejected that. And I'm not sure the Eighth Circuit would feel that same way about it today, you see the date of that decision, the merit of decision, but suffice it to say, selective waiver really doesn't work. It's inconsistent. As I said, once you waive that's, that's it. And then there's some very imaginative courts that have lots of fun with these issues. So Georgia Pacific case in the Southern District here and then having the federal judge mandated a lawyer To sit for a deposition and he could not assert the privilege with respect to communications he had with the two corporate executives who were in charge of the company on the ground that he really when he negotiated the contracts in question with respect to this merger deal. He wasn't acting as an attorney. He was acting as a quote negotiator, close quote. And then in the von Bulow case, the court ruled that Alan Dershowitz is writing a book about how great he was in getting Mr. Von Bulow off a murder charge in Rhode Island. That wasn't a waiver of the attorney client privilege writing a book about his conversations with Mr. Von Bulow, because that was not a disclosure in the judicial system, that you're just writing a book about it. That's, again, a improper application of privilege law. But there is that precedent out there. And another thing that people need to be concerned about and know about is many times very experienced lawyers in the Kidder Peabody case, in front
46:18of you, very experienced lawyers actually put their own privilege in issue and then attempt to shield the materials from the other side, this happened in that case, where a very prominent New York firm did an internal investigation pronounced, excuse me, that out of 3500 people, only one person was responsible, and then in the subsequent litigation, defended the company, on the basis of its internal investigation. And then, obviously, they put their own work product and the privilege issues, front and center by asserting that defense. And this led to the plaintiffs demanding to see the materials, some of which they got some of which they shouldn't, some of which they didn't get, but they should have. So, again, a ruling where a judge didn't really apply the law correctly. And so the plaintiffs didn't get everything they should have gotten.
47:31I want to talk briefly about something called the crime fraud exception, because it's much misunderstood as much uncertainty is not really an exception to the attorney client privilege. Because there is no privilege where a client consultant attorney for purposes of assistance and engaging in a crime or fraud, nor is there a privilege or a client without regard to purpose, uses an attorney's advice to engage in client crime or fraud. Now, there's uncertainty about this exception, because different courts define crime or fraud differently. Different courts have requirements or not that the client must know that the Vice furthers the crime or fraud. Courts sometimes go beyond the crime fraud advice and find waivers to all communications in court sometimes do not require that the client go through with a crime or fraud. Then there's a procedural issue about what can the court look at to determine the crime or fraud exception, only independent evidence or privileged material or both. In the zoldan case, the Supreme Court says both it's sort of a two step process, the plaintiff must have enough independent evidence to support a good faith application. This then triggers an in camera review by the court of whatever privileged information. Notwithstanding this or because, or because of the Supreme Court's ruling lower courts application of this process in practice is very uneven. Some famous cases involving crime or fraud, the Lewinsky case from 25 years ago, involving President Clinton. That crime fraud exception was
49:19invoked successfully. Michael Cohen, who was President Trump's private lawyer, the independent counsel was able to seize Cohen's files. More recently, and I don't have this on the slide, another Trump's lawyers EViD Cochran, the independent special counsel obtain Cochran notes regarding the government documents that were kept by Trump at Mar a Lago. And those notes substantially contributed to the Florida indictment of the former president. So the Those are three pretty prominent examples of how this exception has been used. In some pretty important litigation. Now there's misuse of this crime fraud exception. Tobacco litigation is one example where this has been misused. But remember, I didn't say this before. If we have time to get to this with the Kellogg, brown and root, you'll see this, in virtually all instances, these rulings on these issues are not subject to interlocutory appeal. only way you can get these issues up to the Court of Appeals is if your business is essentially by taking a contempt citation.
50:47But otherwise, these rulings, for example, by the Georgia Pacific case, the lawyer wasn't a lawyer because he was a negotiator. That's an that's not subject to interlocutory appeal. You're just sort of stuck with that. So it's important to know these because you're going to be stuck by these rulings. So now, let's quickly get to Attorney work product. What is this? Well, as I said before, this is not an evidentiary principle. It's grounded in the law of procedure, initially enunciated by the Supreme Court, in the famous Hickman V. Taylor case, Robert Jackson decision, making 47 and then incorporated and rule 26 B, three of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It's weaker than the attorney client privilege, it's a qualified privilege, the other side, can overcome the privilege if they can show a substantial need a substantial need the two different types of work product, there's ordinary work product, which is often found in the, in the context of interview memoranda, which purport to be verbatim transcripts of what a witness has told you.
52:07That's different from so called opinion, work product, opinion work product is, is a materials that reflect the mental processes, the conclusions, the analyses, of claims, how good a witness is going to be the strengths and weaknesses of witnesses, etc. Those all embody opinion, work product, and those are virtually immune from discovery. Now, there's no application of this doctrine outside of the context of litigation. Now, let me emphasize what the litigation means. Litigation means anything adversarial. So if you're in an IRS audit, that's not technically litigation, but that's sure as heck is adversarial. If you're involved in an SEC investigation, that sure as heck is adversarial. It's not litigation, per se. But that surely is what's covered by rule 26 B three. Now, I told you before that the Edelman decision is the right enunciation of what the law is interpreting. What constitutes anticipation of litigation.
53:26Unfortunately, there's some courts in the first circuit. And unfortunately, that the way you're to interpret the law differently, so remember, under Edelman is did you create this work product because of litigation. The Textron decision, the First Circuit in a divided in bank ruling said only things that are designed to be used used in litigation would be protected under the attorney work product doctrine. So very, very different standard. So one, one theme of my talk today is states have states and jurisdictions have different standards, here is a very different standard in the First Circuit than is in the Second Circuit. And I'm sorry to say some other circuits have followed the lead of Textron, again, because generally, courts in the government, they don't like not getting these materials in these adversarial proceedings they bring they want stuff made up by lawyers because that makes the job much easier. The attorney work product as a general proposition is written. There's one state that talks about attorney work product being oral word product. I'm not sure how that really works in California, California, has many different ways of approaching. But that's the only jurisdiction I'm aware of that talks about oral lecture. Any work product. But most other jurisdictions, it's written work product. This can apply to non lawyers. So it's very important to understand that you can have non lawyers working for you who are covered by your attorney client, Attorney work product. Now, this is important difference between the privilege and work
55:25product doctrine. So if someone is working under your Express direction, on a project, in anticipation of litigation, then materials generated by that person, including interview notes, for example, would be protected from disclosure. In a manner, that's someone who's not working under your direction, who's a non lawyer, in a non litigation matter, if somebody tells him or her something, that's not a privilege communication, because it's not covered by one of the five C's. A person's not talking to a lawyer. So this is an area where you can get something broader protection. But if you tried to do it only under the privilege, you would, unfortunately, have That better be subject to disclosure. Use of experts, very important here. Any work product that you show to an expert who is testifying expert, that's fair game to the other side, and has to be given up a non testifying expert, however, you can show that person, all the work product in the world. And that's not subject to disclosure. So be very clear as to when you're showing these materials. I'm giving it to a non non testifying expert, or to a testifying expert.
56:54Very important distinction. This is a waivable. Privilege. But it's not waivable versus visa vie third party is not as waivable as giving it privileged materials to a third party. So let me give you an example. If you share your work, if you share your privilege materials with your clients auditor, that's a waiver of privilege. If you share work product with your company's auditor, that is not work that is not discoverable. So, auditors, of course, lawyers go through this dance all the time, because auditors want to know, what's the status of the litigation? What's the status of this investigation, etc. Be very, very careful to delineate in your mind, am I giving the auditor privileged materials? Or am I giving the auditor work product materials, a very different outcome of that not understanding the delinking of those two concepts. Always remember that about rule 612. Whenever you give something to a witness, let alone an expert to a witness. That's a potential issue in perfecting that person's testimony. And you might be waiving your work product under that circumstances.
58:35Can you share your work product with the government? Well, that was tried by so called oral download of work product in the Herrera case in Florida. And the federal court there rejected an oral download and work product. So be careful what it is you're sharing with not a third party that you have an interest with by an auditor. You're there trying to pull this off by an oral download with the government clearly an adversarial situation. And that was held to be a waiver. In the shortness of time, I could offer many concepts. Let me just talk about the wily case where these confluence of these three event three concepts because that I talked about I wanted to talk about this earlier.
59:31Right. I alluded to it earlier. So that was a whistleblower case. And there the court said we're going to allow a whistleblower to divulge client competences and breach and use privilege communications to further his wrongful discharge claims. Why will they look to that language I talked about before claim or The ABA added to rule 1.6. And said, well, that must mean something, we conclude that it means the ABA wanted to allow lawyers just like Mr. Wiley in this case, to be able to bring a claim and breach his client, his obligations of client confidentiality. Now, that's what the Fifth Circuit ruled. Again, as I said, many courts don't understand these concepts. So here's a classic example. The court court there was wrong on two accounts. First, it believed that the ABA rules constitute federal common law. And as I said at the outset, the ABA rules constitute nothing. They're merely aspirational rules promulgated by a trade association, binding on no one, let alone certainly not constituting federal common law, that's simply just completely wrong. They also equated the ethics rules the ethic rule of confidentiality, with the attorney client privilege, completely wrong. The notion that the company that this gentleman wanted to bring his wrongful discharge claim against, but somehow waive the privilege to allow him to bring his successfully bring his wrongful discharge claim is, of course, absolutely preposterous, never going to happen. So classic case of a court getting it completely wrong. There that stood. And that's the way
1:01:36that ended. Lots of dangers of documents with respect to these inadvertent waiver privileged materials. Some reforms were enacted a number of years ago, rule 26, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 502, and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because in this age of computers, where stuff gets spewed out of computers in document productions, the notion that you could pull back privileged materials, if reasonable steps were taken to prevent the disclosure of these materials, and reasonable steps were taken to rectify the disclosure of these privileged materials. In my judgment, these reforms, close quote, have led to inverse or perverse incentives, it's led to a false sense of security by lawyers, that they don't have to be very careful in document production, they can be sloppy and still get away with it, because these two reforms will help them. The problem is a that sloppy lawyering. But also in addition, I've cited you these cases, where virtually identical, identical, factual situations where courts have reached different results said, one set of protocols was reasonable, the other set of protocols, but it's not reasonable. So what these reforms have done is really kick the can down the road, not from the document production stage, but to when a magistrate judge or federal district judge is making a ruling on whether you and your client are reasonable with respect to how you handle document production. That's a very tricky business. Because a lot of judges don't understand these rules. It's constant theme
1:03:31of my presentation today can be the judge may not like your client may not like you. And remember, these are non appealable decisions that are being made, unless you take a contempt citation. So these are very dangerous areas to sort of feel, Oh, these reforms will save me. These give you a very false sense of security, especially when the federal magistrate judge or judge who doesn't like you or your client. Then there's the inadvertent disclosure of materials under the ethics rules. If you just look at rule 4.4 B, you think, oh, all I have to do is just notify the other side. That, unfortunately, is, as the the comments to the rule may clear, you could be subject to judicial judicial sanctions, if that's all you do. And many, many, many states require you to refrain from looking at the document, return it, or to do both. And the different standards in different states, different standards in the federal courts versus the state courts. In New York State. The the rule is different if you're in federal court, and then if you're in state court, so very dangerous of documents, even non privileged documents. Be very, very careful. If you Some some documents come over the transom that you know you shouldn't have. And you better understand that you need to do a lot of research to understand what it is your obligation to do to deal with these documents. These are some examples of what happened to some law firms who did not handle this well, and Gibson, Douglas disqualified other law firms or disqualified one law firms
1:05:27not disqualified, but a very dangerous place to be litigated. These are some tips to emphasize how to protect confidentiality marked as appropriate documents that are attorney client communication and attorney work product prepared for litigation. But as I was telling my class yesterday, people get into lots of trouble for over legend, the documents and putting on privilege logs, materials that have the stamps on them, but don't reflect privileged communications their dinner orders or lunch orders and things like that. Judges and magistrate judges really don't like that and it really can hurt hurt your credibility. Where appropriate documents created should be tailored to reflect and constitute opinion work product protects should be replete with theories of legal themes, evaluations of liability views as to witnesses etc. In the alternative, any witness interview, verbatim transcripts should be tion where appropriate always observed the five C's rule. document should be created on a shared or distributed on a need to know basis. Efforts to maximize notions of confidentiality should be evident and documentable. In the computer era. Encryption is essential to prove that you did as much as you could do ensure confidentiality. Attorney generated materials should not be shared with third party agents of the company. Cowen's investment bankers etc. Written Communications between outside lawyers and the company should be kept to a minimum such communications domain should be between in House lawyers and outside counsel.
1:07:17To the extent that materials reflect opinion work product, it is better that they reside in outside attorneys, computers or files. Make sure that the lawyers are doing the work. To the extent that experts are needed accountants investment bankers, they should be retained by outside counsel, work as agents of the counsel and set your attention to be should be memorialized, that it is a connection with litigation anticipated or not. Whether say experts are retained for purposes of testifying at trial or for assisting counsel for trial alone. As I said before, it is a very important distinction that must be established at the outset of the retention. Any documents created by said experts should be corrected downside counsel, expert drafts may be discoverable the number of drafts therefore should be kept to a minimum materials created and distributed the board of directors level should be at a minimum should be carefully scrutinized and record records should be kept at the distribution of practical materials should be retrieved after any presentations are made.
1:08:26Use of any such materials in a public forum may be justified for some business reason. But it will waive confidentiality and provide an opportunity for an opponent information on the so called silver platter. So if you divulge an internal investigation report, that's you may be doing that to short the stock price. But it's opening up a can of worms in the civil litigation to follow best practices to follow up on the on the internet. Do not engage in attorney client communications and discussions of legal strategy over the internet. But if you must encrypt now, I said at the outset, I hope that we get to a long discussion and discussion of the Kellogg Brown and root case. I'm already nine minutes over so I don't think we're gonna get to that he's or two decisions by the DC Circuit, which as I mentioned in the article, wrong and Hrothgar is it's truly amazing how many mistakes were made here. So please consult if you're want to see how not to do and make every possible mistake possible. You can read my article, the DC Circuit long or longer. The New York Business Law Journal winter 2015. So with that, thank you for your attention, and I hope you've found this interest in use. And I will sign off at this point. Many thanks